Barbara Walters chats with Forward Syria
Swaying between art and seduction
Discussing monetary policy with the man in charge
Where the earth screams in horror
07/01/2009 - Issue 29
Through the eyes of a US diplomat
Former US Ambassador to Syria Richard Murphy, on Syria and Obamaby Sami Moubayed
Given the hostility prevailing in Washington DC towards Damascus, back in 2005, few veterans believed Syria would outlive the Bush White House. Richard W. Murphy was one of them, constantly calling for engagement with a country he had served in as US ambassador. The 80-year old former diplomat started his career in 1959 at the Middle East Bureau of the US Foreign Service, served in diplomatic posts such as US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and ultimately US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs under Ronald Reagan. He was also director of the Middle East roundtable at the Council on Foreign Relations, and is currently Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute.
Having been active from the Eisenhower to the Obama administration, Murphy spoke to Forward about the new US leader, and what he means for the Middle East. The interview was conducted before Obama delivered his historic speech recently in Cairo.
You are one of the voices constantly calling for engagement with non-state players like Hamas, calls echoed recently after President Obama’s election by veterans like James Baker. Is it possible for the US to “deal” with Hamas similarly to how it dealt with Fateh, after years of branding it a “terrorist organization?”
The US should talk with all players in the region who can play a significant role in revitalizing the peace process. We should not set preconditions on beginning a dialogue, which may be too rigid for a given organization to meet. So, my answer is yes, dialogue between the US and nonstate players like Hamas is possible. I do not consider the current positions either of Hamas or of Israel to be immutable regarding their eventual negotiations with one another. From 1975-1988, the United States kept its pledge not to recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, “so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.” For those 13 years, this policy denied American representatives the opportunity to meet with and possibly avoid some major political developments in the region, including the radicalization and fragmentation of Palestinian politics and the encouragement that this gave to the Israeli settler movement. Our strict adherence to these preconditions lost valuable time, during which we might have assisted the development of mutual trust between that organization and Israel.
You first entered the Foreign Service during President Eisenhower, when the US was accused of encouraging Syria’s neighbors to isolate Damascus, and trying to launch a coup in Syria. Syrians claim that this attitude pushed them towards the Soviet Union. Did the US lead Syria to Iran in 2003-2005 in a similar fashion?
I am familiar with the Syrian view that American policy contributed to Syrian-Soviet closeness, which led Syria into its unsuccessful union with Egypt. I also recall the wry comment of a Soviet diplomatic colleague in Damascus during the 1970s that “you Americans see Syria as a Soviet client state. Let me tell you that Syria accepts everything from Moscow except
advice.”
Did American policy lead Syria to Iran in 2003-2005? I think Syrian leaders have themselves spoken to this. Syria did feel isolated when America overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime and, given the long history of difficult Syrian-US relations, they may well have been apprehensive that Washington was planning a move against Damascus. The perception of an American plan to invade Syria probably did contribute to Syrian interest in consolidating its relations with Iran.
In 1974-1978, you served as US ambassador to Syria. Can you tell us of your impressions of the country, both before and after?
I arrived in Damascus in 1974, a few months after Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had successfully negotiated the initial disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces on the Golan. My own tour was remarkably free of tension as Damascus and Washington sought to establish a new basis for their bilateral relations. My wife and I still exchange holiday greetings and meet with friends we made during that time. I met frequently with former President Hafez al-Assad to discuss American efforts to move ahead on the peace process as well as events such as those involving the Lebanese request for Syrian military assistance in 1976. My meetings with the president normally included an interpreter from the Foreign Ministry whose translations the president would occasionally correct. I always found him keen minded, direct and unfailingly courteous.
Last March marks the twenty-first anniversary of the Halabja massacre, which many Arabs believe took place under the watchful eye of the US and Hussein, blaming it on the Iranians.
In Washington, the news of the gassing at Saddam’s orders of Iraqi Kurds at Halabja was received with dismay and anger. We did not try to blame it on the Iranians. There had been reports around that time which suggested that Iran had also used poison gas on other fronts of the conflict. The fact is, as Secretary Shultz stated recently, we did not want Iran to win that war. We made every effort to discourage would be arms suppliers of Iran from sending arms and ingredients for weapons systems.
Is Middle East peace possible, along with a sustainable relationship for Syria and the US?
I think a period of quiet diplomacy is needed between Damascus and Washington in order to create a better understanding of each other’s policies towards bilateral and regional issues. Neither side should impose preconditions to pursuing dialogue. Peace is possible along with a sustainable sound relationship between Syria and the US, but will take hard work to get there.
